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I. INTRODUCTION
The DNA exonerations of the late twentieth century spawned a re-
form movement arguably as influential in the American criminal jus-
tice system as the Warren Court criminal procedure revolution.1 The
goal of innocence reform is to prevent wrongful convictions by in-
creasing the reliability of criminal justice system operations. A basic
tenet of the adversary system of justice is that an adversary trial will
expose and correct factual errors with procedural tools, such as the
exclusion of unreliable evidence, vigorous cross-examination of wit-
nesses, and the introduction of expert testimony.2 However, DNA ex-
onerations have undermined faith in the capacity of the adversary trial
system to produce reliable results—shifting the focus “upstream” in
the criminal justice system to earlier stages of law enforcement inves-
tigations. Upstream reforms target law enforcement investigative
practices for improvements that will reduce or eliminate the produc-
* Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
1. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Crimi-
nal Justice, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 3 (Sarah Lucy
Cooper ed., 2014); Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death
Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2004).
2. Jules Epstein, Eyewitnesses and Erroneous Convictions: An American Conun-
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tion of unreliable evidence that will later need to be excluded, at-
tacked, or explained at trial.3
At its inception, the innocence movement viewed criminal justice
system reform as a cooperative project bringing together multiple
stakeholders—law enforcement, prosecution, and defense—who
shared an interest in preventing wrongful convictions.4 Upstream re-
form efforts fit well into this cooperative paradigm, with the goal of
using wrongful convictions, not as a source of blame, but as data to be
studied with the goal of improving law enforcement operations. How-
ever, the banner of cooperative innocence reform has frayed over
time, and stakeholders have retreated into the trenches of adversary
conflict. Despite this retrenchment, upstream reform efforts have not
included robust downstream enforcement mechanisms, such as the ex-
clusion of evidence that has not been collected or analyzed according
to emerging improved practices.
This Article explores the viability of upstream criminal justice re-
forms within the context of an adversary and procedural system of
criminal justice, focusing on reforms in eyewitness identification pro-
cedures. Mistaken eyewitness identification evidence is often cited as
the leading cause of wrongful convictions in the United States.5 Eye-
witness identification reforms have also been the most developed up-
stream efforts to grow out of the innocence movement. The success
and limitation of upstream reform in eyewitness identification shed
light on the efficacy of upstream criminal justice system reform more
generally, as well as in areas that are less developed, such as the intro-
duction of false confessions or the use of unreliable forensic science.
Part II of the Article describes the upstream trajectory of reform in
the area of eyewitness identifications. It demonstrates how DNA ex-
onerations have shed light on the inadequacy of trial procedures to
correct or mitigate the damage caused by investigatory missteps that
alter eyewitness testimony, and it explains the reforms to law enforce-
ment investigatory practices that have been recommended by social
science researchers to prevent mistaken eyewitness identifications.
Part III demonstrates the landscape of post-exoneration legal reform,
cataloguing the legislation enacted in a growing number of states that
requires law enforcement agencies to adopt and adhere to eyewitness
identification “best practices.” This Part also demonstrates the reluc-
tance of legislatures and courts to fashion robust downstream enforce-
ment mechanisms to incentivize good investigatory practices, such as
3. Findley, supra note 1, at 13–14; Marshall, supra note 1, at 573.
4. Findley, supra note 1, at 13.
5. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.in
nocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction [http://perma.cc/YHH4-7GM4] (docu-
menting that mistaken eyewitness identification has occurred in 72% of the 325 DNA
exonerations to date).
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establishing a per se rule excluding evidence that resulted from imper-
missibly suggestive eyewitness identification procedures.
The reluctance to adopt a per se exclusionary rule to incentivize
sound law enforcement practices with respect to eyewitness identifica-
tion highlights a paradox within American criminal procedure: Courts
are willing to adopt a per se rule that excludes reliable evidence to
protect the constitutional rights of guilty defendants, but they are un-
willing to exclude questionable evidence that would protect innocent
defendants from being convicted of crimes they did not commit. The
deterrent rationale for a per se exclusionary rule has some justifica-
tion because state statutes increasingly mandate that law enforcement
agencies follow best practices. However, because there is no individ-
ual right against being wrongfully convicted by the state, the down-
stream remedies that are gaining more traction are stronger judicial
gatekeeping authority over the introduction of arguably unreliable ev-
idence under evidentiary rules and the expanded use of expert testi-
mony and jury instructions. Although these corrective measures are
aimed at increasing the reliability of trial results, they lack the power
to influence law enforcement behavior.
This Article argues for an alternative remedy that would keep the
focus on reliability, but also incentivize stronger investigatory prac-
tices upstream—that eyewitness identification evidence arising from
impermissibly suggestive practices be excluded unless identity is cor-
roborated by reliable evidence from another source.6 Independent
corroboration requirements have a deep history in common law, but
they have fallen out of use in modern times. Where they persist, they
serve the purpose of protecting against the risk of conviction on the
basis of unreliable evidence.7 Unlike the corrective trial measures
aimed at limiting the negative effects of unreliable evidence—expert
testimony, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings that limit the
scope of testimony—independent corroboration requirements hold
out the potential to incentivize law enforcement behavior upstream. If
identification evidence gained by impermissibly suggestive procedures
is excluded because it is uncorroborated, the message conveyed up-
stream is that either identification procedures need to be improved or
more investigation must be done before charges can be brought.
6. A similar corroboration proposal was made in 2008 by Sandra Guerra Thomp-
son. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Un-
corroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487 (2008).
Guerra’s proposal, which differs in part from the proposal advanced here, received
some discussion by other academics. See David Crump, Eyewitness Corroboration Re-
quirements as Protections Against Wrongful Conviction: The Hidden Questions, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2009) (highlighting problems with implementing a corrobo-
ration requirement); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification
Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 633–40 (2009)
(reviewing corroboration requirements in the context of other alternative proposed
reforms).
7. See infra Section IV.C.
370 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
Although an independent corroboration requirement holds out the
promise of serving the dual role of ensuring reliability at trial and in-
centivizing law enforcement practices, it poses problems with imple-
mentation. Another important lesson of the DNA exonerations is that
investigative errors are interconnected: Weak evidence in one part of
an investigation can narrow the focus of the investigation, distort the
subjective evaluation of other evidence, and blind investigators to evi-
dence that might exculpate the accused.8 An independent corrobora-
tion requirement will not be effective in reducing wrongful convictions
unless it is implemented with these lessons in mind.
II. THE UPSTREAM INNOCENCE REFORM MOVEMENT
The idea that an actually innocent person could be found guilty in
the American criminal justice system did not gain traction until late in
the twentieth century. Although earlier scholars documented cases of
wrongful conviction, such cases were treated as anomalies, failing to
shake the public’s faith in the efficacy of adversary criminal trial
processes.9 However, as DNA exonerations began to mount in the
1990s, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the façade of relia-
bility of the adversary criminal trial.10 The DNA exonerations demon-
strated that innocent persons had been wrongfully convicted by well-
meaning juries weighing evidence tested through adversary processes.
Moreover, the causes of wrongful convictions pointed to systemic mal-
function, not isolated incidents of human error.
Early in the innocence movement, advocates for wrongfully con-
victed individuals made a decision to use DNA exonerations as a way
to investigate and correct systemic failings in the criminal justice sys-
tem.11 Rather than losing faith in the processes of criminal justice,
they argued that DNA exonerations provided “a window into the er-
ror rate that exists in all cases,” which could be used to identify the
places where the criminal justice system could be improved.12 Opti-
mistically, they posited that for every identified cause of wrongful con-
viction, there was an upstream remedy—a way to improve law
enforcement investigative practices that could prevent wrongful con-
victions in the future.13 Social science academics aided the innocence
reformers by testing the variables within criminal justice system oper-
ations that could be altered to reduce or avoid wrongful convictions.
8. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vi-
sion in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292–93.
9. Findley, supra note 1, at 3.
10. See id. at 4.
11. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
12. Marshall, supra note 1, at 574–75.
13. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 11, at 255–60; see also Marvin Zalman & Julia
Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955, 959–65, 991 (2014)
(describing the “causes and cures” paradigm of innocence reform).
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The most developed upstream reforms have come in the area of
eyewitness identification. Eyewitness identification is powerful evi-
dence of guilt, rooted partly in the layperson’s assumption that a wit-
ness’s perception of an event is like a digital recording that can be re-
played in its original form at any time—most particularly at trial—
without distortion by intervening events.14 The prevailing view is that
the trial process is well-designed to root out errors in such testimony,
using time-worn techniques: The jury has the opportunity to directly
observe the demeanor of the witness; the credibility of the witness can
be impeached; and substantive weaknesses or inconsistencies in the
witness’s testimony can be explored on cross-examination. Moreover,
the assumption has been that juries are fully capable of assessing eye-
witness testimony on their own, without the need for expert
assistance.
Social science research undermines these assumptions about the re-
liability of eyewitness testimony and the capacity of trial procedures
to correct mistaken identifications. Rather than acting as mere record-
ing devices, several decades of research demonstrate that witness per-
ceptions are by nature incomplete and malleable as they are encoded,
stored, and retrieved from memory.15 Once imprinted in memory, a
mistaken identification takes hold and becomes stronger when bol-
stered by feedback that confirms that the witness picked the “right
person.”16 Importantly, the experience of being called as a trial wit-
ness is itself a form of confirmatory feedback, because the choice to
proceed to trial signals to an eyewitness that the police and prosecu-
tors have faith in the reliability of the pre-trial identification.
Traditional adversary trial protections are largely ineffective in cor-
recting the effects of mistaken eyewitness identification. Studies have
largely debunked the assumption that juries have the ability to accu-
rately assess eyewitness testimony by showing that the perceptions of
laypersons fail to match the social science research about the factors
that make eyewitness testimony more or less reliable.17 Studies show,
for example, that jurors are most strongly influenced by the confi-
dence of the eyewitness at trial, which research has shown is only
weakly correlated with reliability.18 An eyewitness’s confident de-
14. Richard A. Wise, et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 812 (2007).
15. Epstein, supra note 2, at 41, 46.
16. See generally Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experi-
ence, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998).
17. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifica-
tions, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 743–45 (2007).
18. Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury
Decisionmaking, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 59–60 (1989). While a witness’s level
of certainty has some diagnostic value in assessing the accuracy of an identification,
the level of certainty at trial is less likely to correlate with accuracy, especially in cases
where a suggestive procedure has been used. Post-identification confirmatory feed-
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meanor and sincerity provide insulation from traditional trial tools
like cross-examination and impeachment, which are designed to ex-
pose lies, not correct honestly held mistakes.19
Upstream reform efforts have focused on getting the law enforce-
ment community to embrace and adopt practices that comport with
social science research about how to reduce the incidence of mistaken
eyewitness identification of innocent suspects. Social science research
divides factors that lead to mistaken identification into “estimator
variables,” which relate to the conditions under which the eyewitness
observed an event, and “system variables,” which relate to the way
identification procedures are conducted.20 System variables include
such features as the composition of the line-up; the pre-identification
instructions given to the eyewitness; whether the person administering
a lineup or photo array knows which person is suspected of commit-
ting the crime; and whether the lineup or photo array is presented
simultaneously or sequentially.21 The research into system variables
opened a door, not only to understanding the causes of wrongful con-
victions, but to identifying specific ways that police procedures might
be improved to reduce or prevent the incidence of mistaken identifi-
cations.22 Because it could be demonstrated that adopting better law
enforcement procedures could reduce the distortion of an eyewit-
ness’s memory, upstream reformers have made the analogy between
memory and “trace evidence” left at a crime scene, which can be con-
taminated if not handled properly.23
An early consensus formed within the social science community
around a set of specific reforms to reduce the incidence of wrongful
conviction, which helped establish the upstream reform agenda. In
1996, the American Psychology/Law Society appointed a working
back will have a larger inflationary effect on witness certainty in cases of mistaken
identification than in cases of accurate identification, making the level of eyewitness
certainty at trial a less useful diagnostic tool. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan,
Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 12
(2008).
19. Epstein, supra note 2, at 41, 51.
20. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and
Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978).
21. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations
for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 627–36 (1998) (reporting
the consensus recommendations of five psychologists appointed by the Executive
Committee of the American Psychology/Law Society to study and draft a white paper
on good-practice guidelines for law enforcement eyewitness identification
procedures).
22. See Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Ap-
plication of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 582 (2000).
23. See Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and
Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 615 (2009); Sandra
Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 331 (2012).
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group to develop good-practice guidelines for conducting lineups and
photo arrays for eyewitness identifications.24 The resulting white pa-
per reviewed three decades of social science research and recom-
mended “four simple rules of procedure that follow from the scientific
literature”25: (1) blind administration, in which the person conducting
the procedure should not be aware of which member of the lineup or
photo array is the suspect;26 (2) explicit instructions to the witness that
the culprit may not be present in the lineup;27 (3) selection of fillers to
match the witness’s prior description of the culprit;28 and (4) a clear
statement taken from the eyewitness at the time of the procedure—
before receiving any feedback—recording the witness’s level of confi-
dence in the identification.29
Three years later, in 1999, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”)
appointed a technical working group to issue guidelines for collecting
and preserving eyewitness evidence in criminal cases, which expanded
the discussion of reform to stakeholders in the law enforcement and
prosecution communities.30 Law enforcement members of the techni-
cal working group were generally receptive to suggestions about how
identification procedures could be improved, having experienced
cases in which eyewitnesses had identified lineup fillers known to be
innocent.31 However, law enforcement participants balked at the idea
of blind administration, which would exclude the participation of in-
vestigating officers, who know which member of the lineup or photo
array is suspected of committing a crime.32 In the end, the working
group did not recommend blind procedures, citing a concern that they
“may be impracticable for some jurisdictions to implement,” and in-
stead flagged blind procedures as “a direction for future exploration
and field testing.”33
Blind administration has emerged as a bellwether of the success of
upstream reform. It is “almost universally viewed by researchers, in-
cluding now the National Academy of Sciences, as among the most
fundamental” of all the eyewitness reforms because it goes to the
heart of the problem—making it impossible for an administrator to
send subtle or unconscious signals to an eyewitness that suggest or
24. Wells et al., supra note 21, at 603.
25. Id. at 627.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 629.
28. Id. at 630.
29. Id. at 635.
30. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE FOR JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
(1999) [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE].
31. Wells et al., supra note 22, at 591.
32. Id. at 594.
33. Id.
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confirm the identity of the suspect.34 It is a standard part of social
science research to screen an administrator from knowledge that
could unintentionally affect the result of an experiment, so that the
idea of blind administration is natural and acceptable to social scien-
tists. However, it deviates greatly from standard law enforcement
practice, where the investigating detective most often administers a
lineup or photo array and observes first-hand the reaction of the wit-
ness. Therefore, the adoption of blind administration procedures is
more than just a tweak to existing law enforcement practices; it re-
quires a radical shift of perspective by law enforcement in deference
to social science research.
By 2014, when the National Academy of Sciences issued a compre-
hensive report (“NAS Report”) and recommendations about eyewit-
ness identification procedures, blind administration had gained wider
acceptance, leading to a recommendation that law enforcement agen-
cies “use blind procedures to avoid the unintentional or intentional
exchange of information that might bias an eyewitness.”35 Notably, in
the time between the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidelines and
the NAS Report, some law enforcement agencies had developed
methods of “blinded administration,” in which the officer administer-
ing a photo array knows the suspect’s identity but is unable to tell
when the witness is looking at the suspect’s photo.36 Such procedures
include computer automated presentation of lineup photos in a ran-
dom order or a low-tech solution called the “folder shuffle” proce-
dure, in which the officer places each photo in a separate folder and
then shuffles the folders before presenting them to the witness.37 The
development of these procedures created a compromise that pre-
served many of the benefits of blind administration, while putting the
cost within reach.
The combination of a well-documented problem with mistaken eye-
witness identification evidence and an available set of research-based
strategies addressing the problem set the stage for significant up-
stream reform in the area of eyewitness identification. Yet, contrary to
the optimism of the early innocence reform movement, and as Part III
will demonstrate, although there have been notable developments,
there has not been a widespread embrace by law enforcement of the
needed reforms to eyewitness identification procedures, and existing
34. Keith A. Findley, Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An
Empirical Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Reform Strategies, 81 MO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 17) (on file with author).
35. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 107 (2014) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id. at 27. Additional procedures in the “folder shuffle” method include always
presenting a filler in the first envelope, and including two blank envelopes at the end,
so that the witness is prevented from knowing when he or she is viewing the last
image. Id.
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legal standards do little to incentivize law enforcement agencies to
pursue upstream reform.
III. POST-EXONERATION ERA LEGAL REFORMS
Although the benefits of reforming eyewitness identification proce-
dures to reduce mistaken identifications are self-evident, upstream re-
form is not self-executing. As social science research about system
variables has become more widely known, some law enforcement
agencies have voluntarily adopted procedures in accordance with ac-
knowledged good law enforcement practices.38 Yet, a 2013 study of
over 1,300 law enforcement agencies of different sizes and geographic
locations demonstrated that “law enforcement agencies for the most
part have not implemented the full range of the 1999 NIJ guide-
lines.”39 Many agencies follow some of the recommended reforms,
such as instructing the witness that the perpetrator may not be present
in the lineup or photo array.40 However, more fundamental reforms,
such as blind administration of lineups and photo arrays, have not
taken hold. About two-thirds of the agencies surveyed continued to
use a non-blind administrator for photo lineups and over ninety per-
cent used non-blind administrators in live lineups.41
Thirteen states have pushed reform more forcefully by enacting
statutes that require law enforcement agencies to institute written pol-
icies for pre-trial identification line-up procedures that comport with
social science research.42 These statutes range from being highly direc-
tive and detailed in mandating that law enforcement follow specified
“best practices,” to allowing law enforcement significant autonomy to
38. Findley, supra note 34, at 25–26 (noting that while there have been “a few
notable leaders” among some police departments “those departments are noteworthy
because they have distinguished themselves, not because they represent the norm”);
see also Rebecca Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Reform and the Role of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535, 549–50
(2013) (discussing the role of voluntary reform).
39. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWIT-
NESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES xiv (Mar. 8,
2013).
40. Id. at ix (“83.9 percent of agencies that use photo lineups and 87.6 percent of
agencies that use live lineups provide instructions that ‘the perpetrator may or may
not be present’ to the witnesses or victims prior to viewing the lineup. However, just
over half of the agencies provide three other instructions recommended by the 1999
NIJ Guide.”).
41. Id. at 61, 64.
42. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-109 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-1P (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-20-2 and 17-20-3 (Supp. 2015) (effective
July 1, 2016); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-5 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 3-506 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. 171.1237 (2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.50 to .53 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83
(LexisNexis 2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (West 2005); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 5581 (Supp. 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.02 (LexisNexis Supp.
2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-1 to -3 (LexisNexis 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 175.50 (West 2006).
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develop their own procedures within more general guidelines.43 Sig-
nificantly, most of the state statutes either recommend or require the
use of blind or blinded administration procedures where practicable,
and some detail specific methods that reduce the need for an indepen-
dent and neutral administrator, such as the use of computer auto-
mated programs or the “folder shuffle” method.44 In some cases,
detailed legislation was enacted only after less directive efforts to en-
courage law enforcement compliance with best practices failed to take
hold.45
Even the state statutes that mandate best practices in detail, how-
ever, provide only weak downstream measures to enforce mandated
eyewitness identification procedures. State statutes typically provide
that failure to follow proper eyewitness identification procedures can
be relevant in determining the admissibility of eyewitness evidence,46
or it can be used to instruct the jury about how much weight to accord
eyewitness testimony.47 Nevertheless, none of the statutes impose a
per se exclusionary rule for deviating from the mandated procedures.
43. See Findley, supra note 34, for a comparison of directive “command and con-
trol” procedures with statutes that take a “new governance” or “experimentalist”
approach.
44. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1P(c)(2) (West Supp. 2015); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-2(a) (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 3-
506.1(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(b)(1) and (c)
(West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.33(B)(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2014); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2(d) (LexisNexis 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(5)(a) (West
2006).
45. Findley, supra note 34, at 36–39 (describing the sometimes arduous legislative
processes in North Carolina, Ohio, Connecticut, Georgia, and Maryland).
46. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-2(j)(1) (West 2006) (stating that law enforce-
ment failure to comply with the requirements “shall be a factor to be considered by
the court in adjudicating a motion to suppress an eyewitness identification or any
other motion to bar an eyewitness identification” but stating that “this paragraph
makes no change to existing applicable common law or statutory standards or bur-
dens of proof”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.33(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2014) (stating
that evidence of the failure of law enforcement agencies to adopt required procedures
or failure of officers to comply with procedures that have been adopted “shall be
considered by trial courts in adjudicating motions to suppress eyewitness identifica-
tion resulting from or related to the lineup”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(d)(1)
(“Failure to comply with any of the [statutory requirements] shall be considered by
the court in adjudicating motions to suppress eyewitness identification.”). Four state
statutes, Connecticut, Maryland, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, are silent as to statu-
tory remedies for the failure of law enforcement agencies to implement or follow
procedures.
47. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-2(j)(2) (West Supp. 2015) (“When war-
ranted by the evidence presented at trial, the jury shall be instructed that it may con-
sider all the facts and circumstances including compliance or noncompliance [of law
enforcement in following statutory procedures for lineups] to assist in its weighing of
the identification testimony of an eyewitness.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2933.33(C)(3) (LexisNexis 2014) (“[T]he jury shall be instructed that it may con-
sider credible evidence of noncompliance in determining the reliability of any eyewit-
ness identification resulting from or related to the lineup.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
284.52(d)(3) (2013) (“[T]he jury shall be instructed that it may consider credible evi-
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The need to specify more robust statutory remedies is necessitated
in part by the inadequacy of the leading constitutional test for exclud-
ing eyewitness testimony gained through suggestive procedures, which
pays lip service to the importance of reliability but is unresponsive to
social science research about what makes an eyewitness statement
more or less reliable.48 In Manson v. Brathwaite,49 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that impermissibly suggestive pre-trial eyewit-
ness identifications could be introduced into evidence as long as they
bear sufficient indicia of reliability.50 Reasoning that “reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testi-
mony,”51 the Court rejected a per se rule that would bar admission of
all identification evidence gained through impermissibly suggestive
identification procedures, and imposed a five-factor “totality of the
circumstances” test for measuring the reliability of identifications
gained through suggestive procedures.52
The problem with the Manson test, as commentators have noted, is
that its “reliability factors” fail to align with the social scientific knowl-
edge about the malleability of eyewitness memory and ignore the ef-
fects of suggestive police procedures. Three of the factors—the
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect, the witness’s degree of at-
tention, and the witness’s level of certainty—depend on the witness’s
self-reports, which research has shown are likely to be inflated by
post-identification confirmatory feedback.53 A fourth factor, the level
of consistency between the witness’s verbal description of the culprit
and the physical characteristics of the defendant, largely fails to pre-
dict accuracy.54 Only one factor—the time that elapsed between the
dence of compliance or noncompliance to determine the reliability of eyewitness
identification.”).
48. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 18, at 12; Amy L. Bradfield & Gary L.
Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A Test of the
Five Biggers Criteria, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 581 (2000).
49. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
50. Id. at 114.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Court adopted a five-factor test set out previously in Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 198 (1972), under which courts must consider: (1) the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of atten-
tion; (3) how accurately the witness’s prior description matches the suspect; (4) the
level of certainty; and (5) the time that elapsed between the crime and the pre-trial
identification. Id.
53. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 18, at 9; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 16, at
365–66; Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewit-
nesses: A Meta–Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COG-
NITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864–65 (2006).
54. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 18, at 13. This is in part because the processes
that lead to good recall (the ability to accurately describe a memory) are different
from the processes that lead to good recognition (the ability to match a stimulus with
a memory). It is also due in part to the interrelationship between the verbal descrip-
tion, the identification of possible suspects based on the description, and the relative
judgments that witnesses make in selecting a suspect from a lineup. Id.
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crime and the pre-trial identification—remains independent of a wit-
ness’s potentially distorted recollection and correlates with what we
know about memory and reliability.
As long as the federal standard in Manson remains intact, evidence
that law enforcement has failed to comply with statutorily required
eyewitness identification procedures will be relevant only to the
threshold determination of whether a procedure was “impermissibly
suggestive,” without touching the problematic Manson reliability fac-
tors that permit introduction of eyewitness identification testimony
despite the use of suggestive procedures. Despite the well-docu-
mented shortcomings of the Manson reliability factors, the Supreme
Court has declined to revisit the standard.55 Further, only a handful of
state cases have rejected or amended the reliability factors to better
align with the social science research.56
In its 2011 opinion in State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme
Court went the furthest among state courts.57 It is not an exaggeration
to say that New Jersey has been a national leader in the area of eye-
witness identification reform. In 2001, New Jersey became the first
state to adopt statewide guidelines for law enforcement conduct re-
lated to identification procedures, mandating those that comported
with social science research.58 Notably, New Jersey a “vertically uni-
fied law enforcement system, in which the Attorney General has di-
rect supervisory authority over all law enforcement agencies in the
state,” made the Attorney General’s guidelines mandatory for all law
enforcement agencies.59 In 2006, New Jersey added language to its
model jury instruction, cautioning a jury that even good faith identifi-
cations may be mistaken, and advising that “a witness’s level of confi-
dence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of
the identification.”60
In 2011, after an exhaustive review of the social science data, the
New Jersey Supreme Court replaced the Manson reliability factors
55. Most recently, the Court had an opportunity to revisit the standard in Perry v.
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728–29 (2012). However, the Court declined to apply
a due process analysis in that case because there was no police involvement in arrang-
ing the suggestive circumstances under which the witness viewed the defendant. Id.
56. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673
(Or. 2012); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005) (rejecting the Manson fac-
tors for show-up identifications, finding them inherently suggestive and subject to ex-
clusion if the show-up was unnecessary under the totality of the circumstances); State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (rejecting the Manson certainty factor as unsup-
ported by social science).
57. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872.
58. Office of Attorney Gen., Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Con-
ducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
(Apr. 18, 2001), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PK53-NRPU].
59. Findley, supra note 34, at 26.
60. State v. Romero, 922 A.2d 693, 703 (N.J. 2007).
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with a standard that is better grounded in social science.61 In Hender-
son, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a special master and
remanded the case for the purpose of reexamining the “assumptions
and other factors reflected” in Manson’s two-part test.62 The special
master reviewed hundreds of exhibits, including more than 200 pub-
lished studies on human memory and eyewitness identification, and
held a ten-day hearing that took testimony from many of the leading
researchers in the field.63 In a nearly 60-page opinion, the court sum-
marized the scientific evidence that had developed since Manson was
decided and ultimately concluded that the Manson test was no longer
valid because “it does not provide a sufficient measure for reliability,
it does not deter, and it overstates the jury’s innate ability to evaluate
eyewitness testimony.”64 In its place, the court fashioned a more flexi-
ble test under which the defendant bears the initial burden of demon-
strating some evidence that the identification procedure was
suggestive, which shifts the burden of production to the State to show
that the proffered eyewitness testimony is reliable, based on both sys-
tem and estimator variables.65
Even from its position at the forefront of eyewitness identification
reform, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court demonstrated a cau-
tious and limited approach toward enforcing best practices. The court
explicitly rejected a per se exclusionary rule for violations of the New
Jersey Attorney General’s mandatory eyewitness identification proce-
dure guidelines.66 It rejected the analogy between eyewitness memo-
ries and trace crime scene evidence on the ground that “[u]nlike vials
of blood, memories cannot be stored in evidence lockers,” and con-
cluded that “we continue to rely on people as the conduits of their
own memories, on attorneys to cross-examine them, and on juries to
assess the evidence presented.”67 Finally, the court left the ultimate
burden on the defendant “to prove a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.”68 Under this relatively high burden of
proof, the court predicted that “in the vast majority of cases, identifi-
cation evidence will likely be presented to the jury.”69
Moreover, despite the New Jersey Supreme Court’s careful consid-
eration of social science relating to the variables that lead to mistaken
eyewitness identification, its opinion paid scant attention to the social
science research on the factors that influence jury decision making.
While the court did not rule out the use of expert testimony to assist
61. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919–22.
62. Id. at 884.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 918.
65. Id. at 919–20.
66. Id. at 922.
67. Id. at 924.
68. Id. at 920.
69. Id. at 928.
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the jury, it stated a clear preference for jury instructions on the ground
that “they are focused and concise, authoritative. . . and cost-free; they
avoid possible confusion to jurors created by dueling experts; and they
eliminate the risk of an expert invading the jury’s role or opining on
an eyewitness’s credibility.”70 This preference runs counter to the ex-
isting social science research, which questions the effectiveness of jury
instructions in helping jurors to distinguish between strong and weak
eyewitness identification evidence.71 By contrast, studies show that ex-
pert testimony can increase the sensitivity of jurors toward factors that
more closely correlate with reliability.72 Hence, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences concluded in a 2014 report that expert testimony was
preferred over jury instructions as a method of educating the jury
about the factors that make an eyewitness’s identification more or less
reliable because of its flexibility, ability to focus on the pertinent is-
sues in a case, and ability clarify the state of research.73
Taken as a whole, the Henderson decision demonstrates ambiva-
lence toward robust downstream reform, even in the face of extensive
study of the factors that lead to mistaken eyewitness identifications.
The next Part explores this ambivalence in more depth, describing the
difficult terrain in constitutional law for imposing a per se exclusion-
ary rule as an incentive to law enforcement and demonstrating why
alternative grounds in evidentiary law on which the reliability of eye-
witness identification have gained better traction.
IV. DOWNSTREAM ENFORCEMENT OF UPSTREAM REFORM
As the previous Part has demonstrated, both legislatures and courts
are reluctant to impose a per se exclusionary rule for eyewitness iden-
tification evidence gained through an impermissibly suggestive proce-
dure. Such a rule, patterned on the deterrent rationale of the
exclusionary rule for law enforcement violations of constitutional
rights, has some justification in light of the increasingly mandatory na-
ture of directives to law enforcement to follow best practices. How-
ever, the mandates to follow best practices in eyewitness identification
procedures arise in the context of a complicated interplay between
reliability and deterrence in constitutional doctrine, in which the court
has focused the exclusionary rule on deterrence and left concerns
about reliability to be worked out at trial. Evidence law provides al-
ternative grounds for challenging the admissibility of unreliable eye-
witness identification testimony or mitigating its effects by educating
the jury with instructions or expert testimony. However, these cura-
tive measures lack the deterrent power of a per se exclusionary sanc-
70. Id. at 925.
71. NAS REPORT, supra note 35, at 42–43.
72. Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury
Decisionmaking, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43–44 (1989).
73. NAS REPORT, supra note 35, at 40, 42.
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tion to incentivize upstream reform. This Part argues for a third type
of remedy, an independent corroboration requirement, which would
blend the concern for reliability with the need to incentivize law en-
forcement to adopt best practices upstream.
A. Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Per Se Exclusionary Rule
As discussed above, in Manson v. Brathwaite, the United States Su-
preme Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule for impermissibly sug-
gestive eyewitness identification evidence, allowing such evidence to
be admitted as long as the evidence can be shown to be reliable. While
the argument for a per se exclusionary rule has been advanced in the
state courts in the years since Manson, it has not succeeded.74
It seems a peculiar twist of logic that courts would be willing to
exclude reliable evidence of guilt, but unwilling to exclude questiona-
ble evidence that has been demonstrated to put the actual innocence
of mistakenly identified defendants at risk. This peculiarity can be ex-
plained in two ways: (1) law enforcement use of impermissibly sugges-
tive identification procedures is simply bad police practice, not really
police misconduct that needs to be deterred with an exclusionary rule;
and (2) because persons who are wrongfully accused of crimes do not
have a constitutional right to be free of wrongful conviction, the use of
law enforcement procedures that lead to wrongful convictions is not a
per se constitutional violation.
The United States Supreme Court has historically been unwilling to
exclude questionable evidence on constitutional due process grounds
based on concerns about its reliability without an accompanying as-
pect of law enforcement misconduct. The primary purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule in the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure
jurisprudence is to deter law enforcement violations of the Constitu-
tion.75 The interest in deterring police misconduct is generally
weighed against an interest in determining guilt or innocence at trial;
the suppressed evidence is considered sound evidence of guilt, ex-
cluded only because it has been obtained through law enforcement
misconduct.76 The reliability of the excluded evidence is thus immate-
rial to the determination of whether it should be excluded.
Consistent with the focus on deterrence, in Perry v. New Hamp-
shire, the Court declined to recognize a constitutional violation based
on the use of impermissibly suggestive eyewitness identifications
74. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); Commonwealth v. Silva-San-
tiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 311–12 (Mass. 2009); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 594
(Wis. 2005).
75. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a Constitu-
tional Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 367–71 (2013); Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B.
Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary
Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 392 (2010).
76. See Sundby & Ricca, supra note 75, at 392–93.
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where “the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law en-
forcement officers.”77 In that case, an eyewitness looked out of her
apartment window while being questioned by one police officer and
identified Perry, who was standing outside next to another police of-
ficer, as the man she had seen breaking into cars in the apartment
parking lot.78 Although “show-ups” are generally considered the most
suggestive kind of identification procedure, the Court concluded that
the Due Process Clause was not implicated by evidence gathered
“without the taint of improper state conduct.”79 Rather, the Court
reasoned that the Constitution “protects a defendant against a convic-
tion based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting
introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to
persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy
of credit.”80
The Court’s rationale in Perry echoes its earlier decision in Colo-
rado v. Connelly,81 where the Court failed to find a due process viola-
tion when the defendant’s arguably involuntary confession arose from
the defendant’s obedience to deific commands he experienced in a
psychotic state rather than from police overreaching. The defendant in
Connelly, who suffered from schizophrenia, was in a psychotic state
and heard the “voice of God” instruct him with increasing intensity to
either confess to a murder or commit suicide.82 In response, he
booked a flight from Boston to Denver and approached a police of-
ficer on the street to confess to his crime.83 Although noting that a
confession induced by mental illness might be unreliable, the Court
declined to find a constitutional violation in the absence of any police
overreaching.84 Instead, the Court held that “the Constitution rightly
leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state laws governing the
admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own.”85
As upstream reforms to eyewitness identification procedures gain
momentum, the failure of law enforcement agencies to adopt, enforce,
or follow them—especially in the face of statutory mandates—could
be seen as a form of deliberate misconduct warranting a deterrent
sanction. However, courts have not been willing to use the exclusion-
ary rule to deter this kind of law enforcement misconduct. In State v.
Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a per se exclu-
sionary rule urged by the defendant, even in the context of the court’s
detailed and well-informed discussion of the problem of mistaken eye-
77. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720–21 (2012).
78. Id. at 722.
79. Id. at 728.
80. Id. at 723.
81. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
82. Id. at 161–62.
83. Id. at 161.
84. Id. at 163–64.
85. Id. at 167.
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witness identification.86 At the time Henderson was decided, the state
had well-established guidelines for best practices in eyewitness identi-
fication procedures, which had been mandatory for law enforcement
agencies in the state for ten years.87 Moreover, the violation of the
procedures in Henderson involved deliberate interference with the
blind administration of a photo lineup by the investigating detectives
when the witness was unable to make an identification.88 Yet the New
Jersey Supreme Court rejected a per se rule, reasoning that
“[a]lthough that approach might yield greater deterrence, it could also
lead to the loss of a substantial amount of reliable evidence.”89
The court’s argument in Henderson begs the question of why the
loss of reliable evidence should matter more in the eyewitness identifi-
cation cases than it does in other areas of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure; the loss of reliable evidence is always the cost of an
exclusionary rule directed at deterring police misconduct. The answer
lies, in part, in the individual rights at stake. Although deterrence of
police misconduct has come to dominate the Court’s exclusionary rule
jurisprudence, the legitimacy of the exclusionary rule has always been
underwritten by its protection of individual constitutional rights
against state interference.90 When law enforcement officers fail to fol-
low eyewitness identification mandates, they do not trench on individ-
ual constitutional rights in the same way as they do when they invade
the protections of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.
The constitutional basis for excluding impermissibly suggestive eye-
witness identification evidence lies primarily in the Due Process
Clause.91 Because due process concerns are tied more directly to the
86. See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
88. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 884 (N.J. 2011). Detective Weber, who did
not know the identity of the suspect, administered a photo array containing a photo of
Henderson and seven fillers. Id. at 880. Weber read the witness instructions that
stated the perpetrator may or may not be in the photo lineup and emphasized that the
witness was “absolutely not required to choose any of the photographs” and “should
not feel obligated to choose any one.” Id. at 881. The witness narrowed the photos
down to two but stated that he “wasn’t 100 percent sure of the final two pictures.” Id.
According to Weber, the witness “just shook his head a lot. He seemed indecisive.”
Id. When Weber reported to the investigating detectives that the witness could not
make an identification, they entered the interview room and spoke with the witness
for one to five minutes. Id. When Weber returned to the room and reshuffled the
eight photos, the witness identified Henderson with certainty, slamming his hand on
the table and exclaiming, “[t]hat’s the mother [———] there.” Id.
89. Id. at 922.
90. See generally Clancy, supra note 75 (arguing that the individual rights justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule should take precedence over the deterrent rationale);
Sundby & Ricca, supra note 74 (detailing the protection of individual rights and the
deterrence of police misconduct as distinct “creation stories” in the history of the
exclusionary rule).
91. In United States v. Wade, the Court declared that a lineup was a critical stage
of pre-trial procedure, at which the defendant had the right to the presence of coun-
sel. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). The same year, the Court
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fairness of the fact-finding process as a whole rather than to the rights
of individuals, a failure to afford adequate process at the lineup stage
of the proceeding can arguably be cured with additional process at
trial. Courts have consistently expressed a preference for admitting
eyewitness identification evidence and educating the jury, through ex-
pert testimony or jury instructions, about how to evaluate the limita-
tions of an eyewitness’s identification gained through suggestive
procedures.92
The Supreme Court’s hesitance to recognize a free-standing consti-
tutional claim based on actual innocence reflects its focus on reliabil-
ity in this area—rather than deterrence. In Herrera v. Collins, the
Court assumed for the sake of argument that a showing of actual inno-
cence, if properly proven, might render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional either on Eighth Amendment or due process
grounds.93 However, the Court declined to fashion a constitutional
standard based on actual innocence, reasoning that “[d]ue process
does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever
cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”94
Since deciding Herrera, the Court has consistently declined to an-
nounce a free-standing constitutional right based on actual innocence
or to imagine the standard of proof that it would take to establish such
a right.95 As a result, even blatant disregard of best law enforcement
practices in eyewitness identification procedures fails to encroach
upon the rights of individuals, and are at best merely aspects of the
process that is due by the state in the course of determining guilt or
innocence and imposing criminal penalties.
B. Evidence Law: Admissibility, Exclusion, and Jury Education
An alternative ground for excluding mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion comes from evidence law rather than from constitutional criminal
procedure. In the most detailed treatment of evidentiary exclusion, in
State v. Lawson, the Oregon Supreme Court crafted standards based
on social science research about mistaken eyewitness identification.
The Oregon Supreme Court applied these standards to evidentiary
declined to apply the right to counsel retroactively but went on to declare a due pro-
cess violation whenever a pre-trial confrontation between the defendant and a witness
was “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.”
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967). The Court then moderated its due
process test, ruling that unnecessary suggestiveness alone does not require the exclu-
sion of evidence if, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification is relia-
ble. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
92. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012); Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925.
93. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
94. Id. at 399 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
95. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 313–17 (1995).
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rulings to determine whether there was a proper evidentiary basis for
the testimony, or whether the testimony’s risk of unfair prejudice out-
weighed its probative value.96 Prior to Lawson, the Oregon test for
admissibility of eyewitness identifications followed the general two-
part framework of Manson v. Brathwaite, by first examining whether
the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and then
evaluating whether it was nonetheless reliable.97 The court, however,
grounded its rule in state evidence law rather than constitutional due
process.98 After reviewing the state of knowledge on eyewitness per-
ception and memory, the court concluded that its test failed to accom-
plish its goal of ensuring that only sufficiently reliable identifications
are admitted into evidence.99
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Oregon Supreme Court
reviewed the current state of scientific knowledge about eyewitness
perception and memory.100 In particular, the New Jersey Supreme
Court summarized the system and estimator variables that impinge on
the reliability of eyewitness identification.101 The court rejected out-
right some of the reliability factors it had previously endorsed, recog-
nizing for example that “[u]nder most circumstances, witness
confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of identification accu-
racy.”102 The court also acknowledged the endemic problem that in
applying these reliability factors, courts rely heavily on inflated eye-
witnesses’ self-reports, creating “a sort of feedback loop in which self-
reports of reliability, which can be exaggerated by suggestiveness, are
then used to prove that suggestiveness did not adversely affect the
reliability of an identification.”103 In analogizing the witness’s original
memory to trace evidence, the court concluded that “it is . . . only the
original memory that has any forensic or evidentiary value” and that
“once contaminated, a witness’s original memory is very difficult to
retrieve.”104
The rule announced in Lawson was not just a re-working of the
reliability factors, it was a re-working of the paradigm under which the
96. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690–97 (Or. 2012); see also Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 379–89 (2012) (elaborating the argument for using tradi-
tional evidentiary rules to exclude unreliable eyewitness testimony).
97. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 683–84 (discussing its test in State v. Classen, 590 P.2d
1198 (Or. 1979)).
98. Id. at 684.
99. Id. at 688.
100. Id. at 684–85. Rather than holding an evidentiary hearing, the Oregon court
found that the state of scientific knowledge justified it in taking judicial notice of the
data contained in over 2,000 scientific studies. Id. at 685.
101. Id. at 686–88. In addition to summarizing these variables in the text of the
opinion, the court set out the research on each of the variables in a ten-page appendix
to the opinion. Id. at 700–11.
102. Id. at 688.
103. Id. at 689.
104. Id.
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reliability and admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence is as-
sessed, drawing guidance from two sources within evidence law.105
First, the court ruled that an eyewitness’s identification is often not
testimony of personal knowledge, but rather “a kind of lay opinion
testimony that is based on a number of inferences and assumptions
made by the witness regarding his or her perceptions.”106 The court
reasoned that, as with all lay opinion testimony, the proponent of the
evidence must establish whether the witness’s identification of the de-
fendant was rationally based on those perceptions and helpful to the
jury.107 When there is evidence that suggestive police procedure might
have influenced the identification, the court ruled, the proponent of
the evidence must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the witness’s identification was based on his or her own
perceptions.108
Second, the court noted that evidence rules permit courts to exclude
an eyewitness’s identification of the defendant if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.109 The court
explained that the probative value of eyewitness identification evi-
dence is affected by the full panoply of system and estimator variables
that affect its reliability: The more factors that weigh against reliabil-
ity, the less probative value the identification will have.110 When the
reliability concerns center on estimator variables alone, the court an-
ticipated that defendants would be more likely to probe the issues
through cross-examination.111 However, when police use suggestive
procedures in obtaining the identification, the court said that the situ-
ation was “particularly susceptible to concerns of unfair prejudice”
and that “‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability—like cross-exam-
ination—can be ineffective at discrediting” the eyewitness
testimony.112
The court remained wary of outright exclusion of eyewitness identi-
fication evidence and encouraged lower courts to fashion “intermedi-
ate remedies” to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice, such as limiting
the witness’s testimony or supplementing it with expert testimony to
assist the jury in evaluating it properly.113 For example, the court
noted that a witness’s self-appraisal of certainty, after receiving con-
firming feedback, may have so little probative value and pose such a
high risk of unfair prejudice that the statement of certainty should be
105. Id. at 691–92.
106. Id. at 692.
107. Id. at 693.
108. Id. (relying on Oregon Evidence Code, Rule 701).
109. Id. at 694.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 697.
112. Id. at 695.
113. Id.
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excluded, even though the identification itself might still be
admissible.114
In discussing alternatives to the exclusion of evidence, the Oregon
court was attentive to the social science about what measures are actu-
ally most effective in educating the jury. After reviewing the pertinent
social science, the court concluded that cross-examinations, closing ar-
guments, and generalized jury instructions frequently are inadequate
to caution factfinders of the pitfalls of eyewitness identification.115 It
therefore favored the use of expert testimony, which can both explain
scientific research to the jury and “may prove vital to ensuring that
the law keeps pace with advances in scientific knowledge.”116 As pre-
viously noted, the preference for expert testimony over jury instruc-
tions is consistent with social science research and in accordance with
the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.117
The evidentiary rationale employed in Lawson has some obvious
benefits in terms of flexibility over a constitutional due process test.
Because the Lawson rationale focuses on the relationship between the
witness’s actual perceptions and the witness’s identification, it has the
capacity to target for exclusion the most problematic aspects of a mis-
taken eyewitness’s testimony—such as the witness’s in-court identifi-
cation of the defendant and expression of certainty at the time of
trial—while preserving testimony about what the witness actually saw
or heard at the time of the crime. Because its rationale is firmly
grounded in concerns about reliability, its focus remains on the
strength of the eyewitness identification evidence. Although law en-
forcement deviation from mandated best practices is a factor in deter-
mining reliability, it is not the sole factor, and law enforcement
misconduct is not a necessary threshold for an evidentiary ruling on
admissibility.
However, the evidentiary rule fashioned in Lawson also has draw-
backs that affect its capacity to incentivize law enforcement policy and
behavior. Evidentiary rulings are generally committed to the discre-
tion of the trial court and are virtually unreviewable on appeal.
Hence, evidentiary rulings serve as flexible and nuanced tools in the
hands of adept trial court judges, but they do little to protect defend-
ants when trial courts fail to understand or incorporate the findings of
social science and do not set the stage to advance the law through
further development on appeal.
Moreover, while the evidentiary approach may be effective in sensi-
tizing juries about how to weigh eyewitness evidence, it does not send
a clear message back upstream to law enforcement agencies about the
importance of following best practices in eyewitness identification
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 696.
117. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
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procedures. When individual cases are well-handled at the trial stage,
the result under Lawson’s evidentiary approach is likely to be the par-
tial introduction of eyewitness evidence coupled with expert testi-
mony. Because it focuses on fine-tuning the evidence and instructions
at trial, the evidentiary framework also does little to touch the plea
negotiation process, which often rises or falls on the strength of an
argument about the admissibility of key evidence. As a result, the cur-
ative approach lacks the effectiveness to incentivize upstream reforms,
such as blind administration of lineups and photo arrays, which law
enforcement agencies may otherwise be reluctant to put into place.
C. Independent Corroboration Requirement
As the foregoing Sections demonstrate, there are problems inherent
in both of the existing approaches to fashioning downstream remedies
for failing to follow the mandates of upstream reform. The constitu-
tional framework does not support a per se exclusionary rule because
failures to follow state-mandated eyewitness identification reforms are
not per se violations of individual rights. The evidentiary framework
can help to correct the distorting effect of impermissibly suggestive
identifications by fine-tuning its use at trial, but this framework fails to
enforce and incentivize adherence to upstream reforms. A third op-
tion would be to fashion a rule requiring impermissibly suggestive
eyewitness identification evidence be corroborated by independent
evidence.118 Because they focus on verification of evidence, corrobo-
ration requirements retain the concern with reliability of convictions.
However, corroboration requirements do more than seek to cure the
problems caused by faulty law enforcement practices; when imple-
mented correctly, they insist on thorough investigations.
Corroboration requirements have a deep—and not always popu-
lar—history in criminal procedure. They date from ancient Judaic law
and continue into English common law, though their use has declined
over time.119 Scotland stands out as a notable exception in continuing
to require that every fact in issue in a criminal case be proven by at
least two independent sources of evidence.120 However, abolition of
118. See Thompson, supra note 6 (examining a similar argument about a corrobora-
tion requirement for eyewitness identification evidence when the witness and the de-
fendant have no prior relationship).
119. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96–103 (1983) (discussing early English
common law that required corroboration of accomplice testimony); Irene Merker Ro-
senberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture”—
Circumstantial Evidence Then and Now, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1376–77 (1995) (dis-
cussing Talmudic law requiring two witnesses for conviction).
120. Fraser P. Davidson & Pamela R. Ferguson, The Corroboration Requirement in
Scottish Criminal Trials: Should It Be Retained for Some Forms of Problematic Evi-
dence? 18 INT’L. J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1, 2–3 (2014).
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the corroboration rule is currently under consideration in the Scottish
Parliament.121
In the United States, corroboration requirements have been applied
selectively to cases in which the reliability of evidence—most often
the reliability of witness testimony—is in question. The United States
Constitution requires that a treason conviction be based on the testi-
mony of two witnesses to the same overt act, and both federal and
several state statutes require corroboration for perjury convictions.122
Corroboration of the testimony of complaining witnesses in rape cases
was historically justified on the ground that women were likely to
bring false accusations;123 the Model Penal Code incorporated a cor-
roboration requirement.124 However, in the wake of changing percep-
tions of the credibility of rape victims, states have repealed the
corroboration requirements as an unnecessary barrier to conviction.125
Today, several states require corroboration for accomplice testimony
because of concerns that accomplice testimony might be tainted by
incentives to testify falsely.126 One state, Maryland, has applied a cor-
roboration requirement to eyewitness identification testimony, but
only in capital cases.127
In the wake of DNA exonerations, scholars and commentators have
endorsed independent corroboration as an appropriate response to
the reliability concerns in eyewitness identification testimony.128 Us-
ing Bayesian logic, Boaz Sangero and Mordechai Halpert argue that
121. Efforts to abolish the rule are currently underway, with a criminal justice bill
that includes abolition of the corroboration requirement passing Stage 1 and at Stage
2 of the proceedings in the Scottish Parliament. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, THE
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/
Bills/65155.aspx [http://perma.cc/5ET9-R63D].
122. Thompson, supra note 6, at 1531–35.
123. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1137 (1986); Rosemary C. Hunter,
Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
127, 155–56 (1996); see also Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972) (describing and critiquing the justifications for the
corroboration requirement in rape cases).
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This code provision is
currently under re-examination by the American Law Institute. Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexu
al-assault-and-related-offenses/ [https://perma.cc/MQL2-EGAK].
125. Hunter, supra note 123, at 155–56; Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the
Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instruc-
tions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 968–73 (2004).
126. Thompson, supra note 6, at 1531–34 (tracing the history of corroboration re-
quirements in the United States and noting that fifteen states apply a corroboration
requirement in some form to accomplice testimony). The Federal Rules of Evidence
provide narrower protection, requiring evidence that corroborates the reliability of an
out of court statement made by an unavailable accomplice against personal interest.
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(B).
127. Thompson, supra note 23, at 363 (discussing a Maryland statute that requires
corroboration of eyewitness identification in capital cases).
128. See Thompson, supra note 6; see also Davidson & Ferguson, supra note 120, at
6–18 (arguing that the Scots corroboration requirement be retained for eyewitness
390 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
corroboration by two sources of evidence should be required because
of its power to decrease the probability of error.129 In addition to pro-
viding a backstop against erroneous evidence, a corroboration re-
quirement would arguably incentivize law enforcement agencies to
more thoroughly investigate cases upstream. Sandra Guerra Thomp-
son has argued that a corroboration requirement would have the ad-
vantages of “prompting systemic changes in police investigations” by
“making it incumbent upon police investigators to continue their in-
vestigations even after obtaining a positive identification.”130
D. The Problem of Sustainable Reform
This Article argues that as a downstream remedy, an independent
corroboration requirement would combine some of the deterrent ben-
efits of a per se constitutional exclusionary rule with the curative evi-
dentiary remedies that courts have found more attractive. As Marvin
Zalman and Julia Carrano have recently argued, the upstream inno-
cence reform movement needs to break out of its “causes and cures”
paradigm, which isolates specified causes of wrongful conviction—like
mistaken eyewitness identification—and proposes appropriate cures
for each one.131 The curative remedies that courts are favoring for
eyewitness identification evidence—expert testimony, jury instruc-
tions, and fine-tuning of testimony through evidentiary rulings—fall
into the trap of isolating and curing problematic evidence at trial
rather than fashioning remedies that can work in a systemic way to
incentivize better practices. Independent corroboration could serve a
dual function by both providing a backstop against the introduction of
unreliable evidence and incentivizing better law enforcement practices
upstream.
To be effective, however, an independent corroboration require-
ment would need to be based on a deep understanding of indepen-
dence that avoids the pitfall of allowing the use of multiple sources of
unreliable evidence to bolster and corroborate each other. Keith Find-
ley and Michael Scott have described the snowball effect that one
piece of unreliable evidence can create, painting a scenario in which a
single piece of unreliable evidence, like a mistaken eyewitness identi-
fication, can lead to the creation or interpretation of other evidence as
inculpatory. As they describe:
Convinced of guilt, investigators might then set out to obtain a con-
fession from that suspect, producing apparently inculpatory reac-
identification evidence in cases where the witness has no previous acquaintance with
the perpetrator).
129. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based
on a Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 44
(2007).
130. Thompson, supra note 6, at 1495.
131. Zalman & Carrano, supra note 13, at 960–62.
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tions or statements from the suspect, or leading investigators to
interpret the suspect’s innocent responses as inculpatory. The pro-
cess of interrogating an innocent suspect might even produce a false
confession. Police and prosecutors, convinced of guilt, might recruit
or encourage testimony from unreliable jailhouse snitches, who
fabricate stories that the defendant confessed to them, in hopes that
they will benefit in their own cases from cooperation with authori-
ties. Forensic scientists, aware of the desired result of their analyses,
might be influences—even unwittingly—to interpret ambiguous
data or fabricate results to support the police theory.132
As Findley and Scott write, “this additional evidence then enters a
feedback loop that bolsters the witnesses’ confidence in the reliability
and accuracy of their incriminating testimony and reinforces the origi-
nal assessment of guilt held by police, and ultimately by prosecutors,
courts, and even defense counsel.”133
Findley and Scott’s scenario is borne out by recent empirical schol-
arship examining the factors that predict wrongful convictions and
analyzes how those factors interact.134 A study co-authored by Jon
Gould statistically paired over two hundred erroneous convictions
with over two hundred cases in which errors were caught prior to con-
viction (called “near misses” by the researchers).135 It found that some
of the traditionally understood “causes” of erroneous conviction, in-
cluding erroneous eyewitness identification, occurred in both samples,
and their presence alone did not predict a wrongful conviction.136
What did make a difference was the way law enforcement and prose-
cutors responded—whether they continued to investigate and ques-
tion the evidence, or whether they attempted to bolster it with
additional evidence of questionable reliability.
As the Gould researchers concluded, the primary problem is not the
presence of evidence that often leads to wrongful conviction, but tun-
nel vision—the tendency of police and prosecutors to “focus on a sus-
pect, select and filter the evidence that will ‘build a case’ for
conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away
from guilt.”137 Some of the factors that made a statistical difference
between an erroneous conviction and a near miss included whether
the case was located in a state with a more punitive culture138 or
whether the defendant had a prior record that might have influenced
the police or prosecutor to an erroneous judgment of the defendant’s
132. Findley & Scott, supra note 8, at 293 (citations omitted).
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. See Zalman & Carrano, supra note 13, at 982–87.
135. Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471
(2014).
136. Id. at 489.
137. Id. at 504 (quoting Findley & Scott, supra note 8, at 292).
138. Id. at 497.
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guilt in the case.139 Other factors related more specifically to the be-
havior of the police or prosecutors. Forensic evidence, for example,
could be used to detect error when used in a rigorous, independent
assessment of the defendant’s guilt, but could compound the error
when deployed in a biased way to bolster the prosecution’s case.140
Notably, one of the statistically significant factors that harmed an in-
nocent defendant was a weak prosecution case, largely because prose-
cutors had a tendency to seek to prop up weak cases by failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence or by relying on false testimony by jail-
house snitches or other individuals with a motive to lie.141
The Gould study underscores the importance of pushing police and
prosecutors to seek corroboration of guilt from multiple sources. To
the extent that independent corroboration requirements incentivize
further investigation, an independent corroboration requirement
points in the right direction. Indeed, one of the reforms recommended
in the Gould study is that investigators should not treat “any one
piece of evidence as definitive in proving innocence or guilt” but
should instead “gather and evaluate all evidence, while being mindful
of its limitations.”142 However, the Gould study also points to the
darker side of independent corroboration, highlighting the tendency
of some prosecutors and law enforcement agencies—particularly
those that operate in a punitive and conviction-oriented culture—to
respond to a weak case by seeking to bolster it with additional unrelia-
ble evidence. At the end of the day, the effectiveness of an indepen-
dent corroboration requirement will rise and fall on the ability of
courts to distinguish the difference between truly independent sources
of evidence, and manufactured corroboration.
V. CONCLUSION
The upstream reform movement resulting from the DNA exonera-
tions of the late twentieth century is slowly making its mark on the
criminal justice system. The early insight that DNA exonerations
could be used to identify and correct systemic flaws in investigatory
practices has won the attention of a limited number of state legisla-
tures and courts. As upstream reform matures, it could benefit from
more robust downstream enforcement, not merely to manage faulty
evidence but to incentivize changes in law enforcement investigation.
Until these downstream remedies develop more capacity to create ac-
countability, the necessary changes to the criminal justice system will
remain at the mercy of good intentions of those who are well-
informed.
139. Id. at 498.
140. Id. at 500.
141. Id. at 501–03.
142. Id. at 510.
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As this Article has argued, a per se exclusionary rule patterned af-
ter the exclusionary rule in constitutional criminal procedure could be
justified to enforce and incentivize law enforcement adoption and ad-
herence to best practices. However, such a rule has not taken hold,
largely because in a procedural system of justice, bad investigation
does not, in itself, trench on any individual right. Corrective measures
at trial based in evidentiary rulings have been more favorably received
by courts, but they lack deterrent force. An independent corrobora-
tion requirement could provide the dual function of preventing unreli-
able evidence from reaching the jury and incentivizing more upstream
investigation prior to charging. To serve these functions well, however,
an independent corroboration requirement must be developed with
an understanding of the other lessons learned about tunnel vision and
the systematic interaction of factors that lead to wrongful conviction.
